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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH RASMUSSEN AND FAUN 
RASMUSSEN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
•vs. • 
No. 4218 
NEAL GL DAVIS AND DORA S. DAVIS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiffs brought this action against the defendants 
to recover damages from the defendants on account of the 
alleged false and fraudulent representation made by the 
defendants to the plaintiffs in connection with a contract 
wherein and whereby the plaintiffs agreed to purchase 
and the defendants agreed to sell some tracts of land in 
Sanpete County, Utah, with the improvements thereon, 
together with some shares of water right, farming, ma-
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chinery, twelve head of cows, five calves and twenty 
sheep. 
In such action the plaintiffs also sought to have the 
court declare null and void a provision of the contract 
which in effect provided that the defendants may, upon 
default in performance of any of the obligations of the 
contract by the plaintiffs, rescind the contract and re-
tain whatever had been paid thereon as liquidated dam-
ages. The basis upon which plaintiffs alleged such pro-
vision of the contract is null and void is that the same 
constituted a penalty and as such is against public policy 
(E. 1-18). 
To the complaint the defendants filed their answer 
and three counterclaims. In their answer they admitted 
the execution of the contract set out in plaintiffs' com-
plaint, but denied generally the other allegations thereof. 
In their counterclaims, defendants alleged that plain-
tiffs had failed to pay an installment of $5000.00 that 
became due on January 1st, 1952, the interest on the 
amount remaining unpaid on the contract and taxes and 
insurance premium, the amount of which is not alleged. 
Defendants also alleged that plaintiffs had commit-
ted waste on the property, had sold some of the personal 
propert}^ and that because of such breach of the contract 
defendants had been damaged in excess of $8000.00. 
Defendants also alleged in their counterclaim that they 
rescinded and cancelled the contract set out in plaintiffs' 
complaint and retained the down payment of $8000.00 as 
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liquidated damages and demanded possession of the 
property mentioned in the contract and for $1000.00 
attorney's fee. 
By the second counterclaim defendants sought to 
foreclose a mortgage for the payment of $5000.00 due on 
January 2, 1952 and for interest on the money not paid, 
for $1000.00 attorney's fee and for insurance premiums 
and taxes in an amount not alleged. 
In a third counterclaim, defendants sought a judg-
ment against the plaintiffs for various sums of money 
for a gas stove, a couch, a water heater, chickens, feed for 
livestock and other items in the total amount of $1805.00 
together with interest thereon at 6% per annum from 
March 15,1951 (Tr. 12 to 19). 
Plaintiffs answered the counterclaims of the defend-
ants in which answers plaintiffs attacked as void a num-
ber of the provisions of the contract between plaintiffs 
and defendants which were set out and relied upon by the 
defendants for the relief they sought. Plaintiffs ad-
mitted that they sold some of the farming equipment for 
which they had no use and that they also sold some calves 
and lambs in which defendants had no title or right. 
Plaintiffs in their answer to the counterclaim consented 
to a rescission of the contract between them and the de-
fendants and consented that the defendants be permitted 
to retain sufficient of the down payment of $8000.00 to 
pay for any property that may not be returned to the de-
fendants and for the reasonable rental value of the prop-
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erty mentioned in the contract between the parties here-
in during the time they had the possession thereof. 
In their answer to the third counterclaim, the plain-
tiffs admitted that they agreed to pay defendants $180.00 
for a gas stove, a couch and a water heater, but denied 
generally the other allegations of the counterclaim (R. 
21 to 26). 
Before the case came on for trial upon the original 
pleadings, the plaintiffs were, by the court, granted leave 
to file, and they did file an amended and supplemental 
complaint. In such pleading, plaintiffs alleged generally 
the same matters that were alleged in their original 
pleadings. They further alleged that after the original 
pleadings were filed an oral agreement was entered into 
whereby the contract between plaintiffs and defendants 
was cancelled and rescinded; that the property which 
plaintiffs were to receive and were given possession of 
under the contract was returned to the defendants, except 
the pieces of farming machinery that had been sold bjr 
the plaintiffs and that in lieu of such machinery, the 
plaintiffs delivered to and there was accepted by the 
defendants some hay and sheep. 
In the amended and supplemental complaint it is 
further alleged that by the oral agreement so entered 
into, it was agreed that the defendant, Neal G. Davis, 
should retain sufficient of the $8000.00 to reimburse de-
fendant, Neal Gr. Davis, for the rental of the premises 
during the time plaintiffs had possession thereof and any 
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damages that might have been done to said premises and 
personal property while plaintiffs were in possession of 
the same, and that plaintiff, Kenneth Rasmus sen, would 
get in contact with his attorneys in an attempt to get an 
agreement with the defendants as to the amount of the 
$8000.00 that was paid down on the contract that should 
be retained by the defendants as rental and damages. 
I t is further alleged in the amended and supple-
mental complaint that plaintiffs and defendants iiave 
been unable to reach an agreement as to the amount that 
should be retained by the defendants and that $2000.00 
is ample to reimburse the defendants for the rental of the 
real and personal property mentioned in the contract and 
for any damages that might have been done to such prop-
erty during the time the same was in possession of the 
plaintiff. 
To the amended and supplemental complaint the de-
fendants answered. In their answer, they set up three 
defenses: 
In the first defense they allege that the contract 
between them and the plaintiffs had been rescinded by 
the defendants because of the breach thereof by the plain-
tiffs and that the $8000.00 was a reasonable compensation 
for such breach and that plaintiffs agreed that defendants 
should retain the same. 
The second and third defenses are in substance the 
same as the first (R. 39 to 41). 
Plaintiffs replied to the answer of the defendants in 
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which reply they deny that they agreed that defendants 
were to retain the $8000.00. 
I t was upon the issues raised by the amended and 
supplemental complaint of the plaintiffs, the answer of 
the defendants thereto, and plaintiffs' reply to the answer 
that the cause came on for trial (R. 43 to 44). 
When the case was called for trial, plaintiffs asked 
leave of the court to amend their amended and supple-
mental complaint in conformity with a copy of such mo-
tion theretofore served upon the defendants. By such 
proposed amendment plaintiffs sought to charge the 
defendants with having, prior to the execution of the 
contract between the parties herein, falsely represented 
that the heating of the home on the premises described 
in the contract between plaintiffs and defendants cost 
only a little more than to heat the same with coal while 
in fact such costs of heating said house with oil was sub-
stantially six times as much as the cost of heating the 
same with coal (E. 45). 
Defendants' counsel objected to permitting the 
amendment to be made. The court took the motion under 
advisement (R. 3-4). 
The evidence offered and received in this case, par-
ticularly the cross-examination of the plaintiffs is quite 
lengthy when viewed in light of the limited issues raised 
by the pleadings. In view of such fact we shall confine 
ourselves in this brief to directing the attention of the 
court to only those portions of the evidence which we 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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deem necessary to an understanding and a proper de-
termination of the matters wherein appellants claim the 
trial court erred in rendering the judgment appealed 
from. There is no controversy concerning these facts. 
On March 15, 1951 the defendants as sellers and t in 
plaintiffs as buyers entered into a written contract where-
by the defendants agreed to sell and the plaintiffs agreed 
to buy the land, water stock, farming equipment, cattle 
and sheep described in the contract, a copy of which is 
attached to the original complaint and another copy is 
attached to the supplemental complaint and in each 
case marked Exhibit A. The contract was received in 
evidence as plaintiffs' Exhibit A (E. 6 and 54). 
The total price agreed upon for the property was 
$32,000.00 of which $8000.00 was paid in cash and the 
plaintiffs gave a Chattel Mortgage to defendant, Neal G. 
Davis, for the sum of $5000.00 as security for the pay-
ment of the installment of $5000.00 which, by the terms 
of the contract, became due on January 1, 1952. The 
court so found (R. 73). 
The contract of sale and purchase contained among 
others the following provisions: 
"The Buyers may take immediate possession 
of said property and they may continue in pos-
session of said property while this contract re-
mains in good standing and until a breach or de-
fault by the Buyers, but immediately upon the 
happening of any breach or default by the Buyers 
or at any time thereafter (without prejudice on 
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account of Sellers' failure to act or any action 
taken for a previous default) the Sellers shall 
have the right to rescind this contract and to 
terminate the same and forfeit all of the right 
of the Buyers herein in and to said property and 
to hold and retain all payments received from the 
Buyers and all improvements upon said property 
and all replacements of said personal property 
and livestock as liquidated damages, (which dam-
ages are hereby declared to be the damages the 
Sellers shall suffer in the event of such breach 
or default) etc." Exhibit A. 
I t also appears without controversy that plaintiffs 
went into possession of the property described in the 
contract immediately after its execution and remained 
in possession thereof until on or about February 15,1952 
when the contract was rescinded and the property de-
scribed therein returned to the defendants (Tr. 22). 
From time to time during their occupancy of the 
property described in the contract here involved, the 
plaintiffs complained to the defendants about the mis-
representations made by the defendants to the plaintiffs 
about the property covered by the contract and par-
ticularly about the property being free from weeds, 
(Tr. 8-18-94-98-99-152) free from alkali, (Tr. 15-18-83-
93) its ability to furnish feed for all the milch cows and 
sheep (Tr. 13-15-19), the cost of heating the home with oil 
(Tr. 139-140-177). 
There were a number of conversations and attempts 
to settle the controversy between plaintiffs and defend-
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ants prior to the time the contract was rescinded (Tr. 
103-106-113-114-121). 
During the time plaintiffs were in possession of the 
premises which they agreed to purchase, they sold some 
of the farm equipment for which they had no use. To 
pay for the equipment, plaintiff, Kenneth Rasmussen, 
gave defendant, Neal G. Davis, some hay and sheep which 
were accepted by Davis in payment for the machinery 
sold (Tr. 31-43-108-116). It is in effect so alleged in de-
fendants' answer to the amended and supplemental com-
plaint (R. 40). It was so found by the trial court (R. 
72). 
As bearing on the reasonable value of the use and 
occupancy of the property described in the contract be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants during the eleven months 
that plaintiffs were in possession of the property, the 
evidence shows: 
That plaintiff, Kenneth Rasmussen, levelled about 
20 acres of the land described in the contract at a cost of 
$750.00 of which amount plaintiffs paid $350.00 and the 
Federal Government paid $400.00 (Tr. 13). That in 
addition to the hay raised on the Davis property, plaintiff 
purchased grain to feed the dairy cows in the amount 
of $1300.00 (Tr. 20). That he raised about 500 bushels 
of wheat (Tr. 11) that there was about 15 tons of hay 
raised on the Davis land (Tr. 8) which was only about 
one-fifth of the hay fed to the dairy cows that was raised 
on the Davis property (Tr. 21); that plaintiffs sold wool 
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from the sheep and received therefor about $400.00 (Tr. 
32). Plaintiff sold some wild hay for about $60.00 (Tr. 
38). Mrs. Faun Basmussen, one of the plaintiffs, who 
handled the money derived from the dairy cows testified 
that she had gone over the amount of money that was 
received for the milk sold from the dairy cows and that 
during five and one-half months they received $2200.00 
which was an average of the money received from that 
source (Tr. 170). That about two-thirds of the milk pro-
duced and sold came from cows that were owned by the 
plaintiffs before they entered into the contract with the 
defendants. The plaintiff, Kenneth Basmussen, testified 
that the usual rental paid for land in Sanpete County is 
that the tenant gets one-half of the crop for operating 
the land and the land-owner gets the other one-half and 
the tenant furnishes the equipment; that the witness did 
not know of any custom or practice as to the division 
of the profits in operating a dairy. 
The plaintiff, Kenneth Basmussen repeatedly testi-
fied that it was agreed that the contract should be 
rescinded, but that he and defendant, Neal G. Davis, 
could not and did not agree upon who should have the 
down payment of $8000.00; that it was finally agreed 
that the matter should be left to the attorneys for the 
respective parties to adjust, if they were able to adjust 
the same. (Tr. 25, 42, 100, 112, 113, 114, 117). Mr. Eas-
mussen further testified that he did not think he could 
settle the case without the consent of his attorneys. 
(Tr. 118), 
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During the course of the examination of the plain-
tiff, Mrs. Rasmussen, the following occurred: 
"Q. Where did you next learn of what, if any-
thing, had been done toward a settlement of 
this dispute? 
A. That evening. 
Q. And who did you learn that from? 
A. Kenneth. 
Q. What did he tell you? 
A. He told me that he had given Neal Davis the 
sheep, three ton of hay in replacement for 
the machinery we sold. That we had straight-
ened that matter up and we were going to 
give them possession of the place, but at no 
time did I consent— 
MR. WOOLLEY: Just a minute, don't go on. 
THE COURT: Don't say anything else. 
Q. Was anything said by your husband as to 
the matter of the $8000.00 ? 
A. Yes sir. 
THE COURT: In his presence? 
THE COURT: If there is no objection, I will 
let her testify, if there is, I won't, 
MR. WOOLLEY: We object, She is talking 
to her husband. This is a conversation she had 
immediately after he returned from talking with 
Mr. Davis, on or about the 13th day of February, 
1952, when apparently some arrangement had 
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been made between Mr. Davis and Mr. Rasmus-
sen. 
THE COURT: Well, she just testified that 
her husband told her he had traded the twenty-one 
head of sheep and the three tons of hay for the 
machinery that he had taken. Now he again has 
asked her what else the husband told her. If 
you gentlemen want to let it in, it is all right with 
me. 
MR, WOOLLEY: If I had any idea what her 
answer would be, I don't know whether we would 
object or not. We think it is incompetent. 
THE COURT: I t is clearly hearsay." (Tr. 
185). 
In the absence of the jury, counsel for the plaintiff 
stated that plaintiff offered to show, if the plaintiff were 
permitted to testify, she would testify that her husband 
stated to her, at or just prior to the time they moved 
out of the Davis home that he had settled the matter 
with respect to the property and machinery and had 
turned the farm over to them, but the $8000.00 should 
be settled by the attorneys or disposed of in further 
litigation. To which Mr. Woolley stated: "Let the record 
show that counsel for the defendants objects to that 
offer." Mrs. Rasmussen further testified that at or prior 
to the time that she moved off the Davis property, which 
is involved in this action, she did not know or have any 
information that the $8000.00 was to be retained by Mr. 
Davis. (Tr. 185). 
I t will be seen from the pleading of the parties that 
there is no controversy about the contract between the 
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plaintiffs and defendants having been rescinded. The 
plaintiff alleges that the terms of the rescission were 
that the disposition to be made of the down payment was 
to be left to the attorneys to agree upon, or if they could 
not agree, then to be determined by the courts. (E. 31). 
On the other hand the defendants allege that by the 
terms of the rescission of the contract the defendants 
were to retain the down payment of $8000.00. (R. 40). 
Such being the principal issue, much of the evidence 
brought out by the cross-examination is wholly foreign 
to such issue, and we have purposely confined our refer-
ence to that portion of the evidence which bears upon 
that issue together with such evidence as may shed light 
on the reasonable rental value of the property described 
in the contract during the time the plaintiffs were in 
possession thereof. In light of the fact that the defend-
ants moved for judgment at the conclusion of plaintiffs 
evidence and the further fact that such motion was 
granted, the value of the use and occupation of the 
property described in the contract between plaintiffs and 
defendants seems to have been ignored by the trial court. 
I t is from the judgment entered by the trial court at 
the conclusion of plaintiffs evidence that the plaintiffs 
prosecute this appeal. 
SPECIFICATION OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
FOR A REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT APPEAL-
ED FROM: 
The errors upon which the appellants rely for the 
reversal of the judgment appealed from a re : 
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POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE EVI-
DENCE OFFERED BY THE WITNESS FAUN RASMUSSEN, 
ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS HEREIN, TO THE EFFECT 
THAT HER HUSBAND, THE OTHER PLAINTIFF, TOLD 
HER JUST BEFORE THEY VACATED THE PREMISES 
THAT THE ATTORNEYS WERE TO DETERMINE WHO 
SHOULD GET THE $8000.00 AND IF THEY COULD NOT 
AGREE, IT WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 
(Tr. 185). 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
ING NO. ONE WHERE IT FOUND THAT THERE IS NO 
QUESTION OF FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION IN THIS 
CASE WHICH SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
AND THAT THE CONTRACT MADE BETWEEN THE 
PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE IS A 
VALID ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. (R. 72). 
POINT THEEE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
ING NO. THREE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ONLY 
QUESTION INVOLVED IS WHETHER THE DOWN PAY-
MENT OF $8000.00 MAY PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED AS 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OR WHETHER THE SAME 
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BY THIS COURT AND LEFT 
TO THE JURY TO DECIDE. (R. 73). 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING 
NO. FOUR TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FORFEITURE 
CLAUSE INVOLVING THE $8000.00 DOWN PAYMENT IS 
FAIR AND JUST UNDER THE CONTRACT; THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS TERMINATED SAID CONTRACT OF THEIR OWN 
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FREE WILL AND THAT THE $8000.00 DOWN PAYMENT 
PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT SHOULD BE AND 
HEREBY IS FORFEITED BY PLAINTIFFS TO DEFEND-
ANTS AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, WHICH, IN THE 
OPINION OF THE COURT, ELIMINATES ANY QUESTION 
OF DAMAGES TO BE DETERMINED BY THE JURY. (R. 
73). 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS FAILED TO PAY THEIR PART OF THE TAXES 
ON THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE CONTRACT 
AND FAILED TO PAY THE FIRE INSURANCE PREMIUM 
UPON THE PROPERTY. 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
ING NO. SIX WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT THE PARTIES 
HAVE DISCHARGED AND TERMINATED ALL THEIR 
RIGHTS INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ACTION 
SHOULD BE DISMISSED AND DEFENDANTS SHOULD 
BE AWARDED THEIR COSTS. 
POINT EIGHT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
THAT THE ACTION BE DISMISSED AND THAT DEFEND-
ANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
ABGUMENT 
This is an action at law. When it was commenced 
the action was for fraud. Thereafter the parties entered 
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into an agreement whereby the contract was rescinded. 
In their amended and supplemental complaint, plaintiffs 
alleged that by the terms of the rescission, the attorneys 
for the parties were to agree upon the division of the 
$8000.00 and if they were unable to agree, the same 
should be determined by the court. The defendants 
alleged that by the terms of the rescission the defendants 
were to retain the down payment of $8000.00. I t is, of 
course, elementary that, in the absence of an agreement 
to the contrary, a rescission carries with it the obligation 
of each of the parties to restore to the other that which 
has been received. 12 Am. Jur . page 1031, Sec. 451 
where it is said: 
"The very idea of rescinding a contract im-
plies that what has been parted with shall be 
restored on both sides. Releasing one party from 
his par t of the agreement and excusing him from 
making the other party whole does not seem 
agreeable to reason or justice. Hence the gen-
eral rule is that a par ty who wishes to rescind 
an agreement must place the opposite party in 
status quo. An attempted restoration of the 
status quo is an essential par t of rescission of a 
contract." 
Numerous cases from state and federal courts are 
collected in foot notes to the text. The law in such par-
ticular is so well settled that we refrain from a further 
discussion thereof. Under plaintiffs pleading and evi-
dence the question to be determined i s : What was the 
amount that plaintiffs were to pay for the use and 
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occupancy of the property described in the contract 
between the plaintiffs and defendants? That was a 
question for the jury. 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE EVI-
DENCE OFFERED BY THE WITNESS FAUN RASMUSSEN, 
ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS HEREIN, TO THE EFFECT 
THAT HER HUSBAND, THE OTHER PLAINTIFF, TOLD 
HER JUST BEFORE THEY VACATED THE PREMISES 
THAT THE ATTORNEYS WERE TO DETERMINE WHO 
SHOULD GET THE $8000 00 AND IF THEY COULD NOT 
AGREE, IT WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 
(Tr. 185). 
Before the contract between the plaintiffs and de-
fendants could be rescinded by agreement of the parties 
it was necessary that both of the plaintiffs agree to 
such rescission. Since married women were emancipated, 
they have the same right to enter into a contract as do 
their husbands and their rights are entitled to the same 
protection as their husband's. Indeed under the evi-
dence in this case it was Mrs. Easmussen who was 
required to carry the principal burden of carrying out 
the contract. During the winter season, Mr. Easmussen 
was away from home and Mrs. Easmussen had charge 
of operating the dairy that was conducted on the farm. 
(Tr. 22). So far as appears, Mrs. Easmussen did not 
agree to release any interest the plaintiffs had in the 
down payment of $8000.00. By their counterclaim the 
defendants sought a rescission of the contract, which if 
granted, would entitle the Easmussens to such portion 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
of the $8000.00 down payment as remained after the 
defendants were made whole. So far as appears Mrs. 
Easmussen never authorized her husband to release her 
right in the down payment of $8000.00. In this case 
much of the business connected with entering into the 
contract for the purchase of the property therein men-
tioned was conducted by Mr. Easmussen. Such fact may, 
in a measure, tend to show that Mrs. Easmussen is 
bound by what he did, unless she timely made objection 
to what he did. It was to rebut any such claim that we \ 
offered to show what Mr. Easmussen told his wife about 
what was to be done with the $8000.00 just before the
 : 
Easmussens vacated the property they were buying from 
the Davises. 
There are a number of well recognized exceptions 
to the rule excluding hearsay evidence. Among such 
exceptions it is thus stated in 31 C.J.S., page 988, Sec, 
239: 
"Where the fact that a particular statement 
was made is of itself a relevant fact regardless 
of the truth or falsity of such statement, the 
statement is admissible in evidence as an inde-
pendently relevant fact." 
The doctrine so announced is the holding of this 
court in the case of Parry v. Harris, 93 Utah 317; 72 Pac. 
(2d) 1044. Applying such doctrine to the case in hand, 
it is of the utmost importance to know the circumstances 
under which Mrs. Easmussen consented to move from 
the Davis property. If she left the property because 
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she was told that part of the down payment of $8000.00 
was to be repaid to her and her husband, that is one 
thing. If she had reason to believe and did believe that 
she was giving up all claim to the down payment of 
$8000.00, it is quite another. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
ING NO. ONE WHERE IT FOUND THAT THERE IS NO 
QUESTION OF FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION IN THIS 
CASE WHICH SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY 
AND THAT THE CONTRACT MADE BETWEEN THE 
PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE IS A 
VALID ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT. (R. 72). 
To call the foregoing language a finding may well 
be a misnomer. I t can more properly be called a Con-
clusion of Law. If it is meant by the first par t of the 
foregoing finding that it is not of controlling importance 
whether fraud was or was not perpetrated by the de-
fendants upon the plaintiffs in the course of the nego-
tiations which resulted in the execution of the contract, 
we have no quarrel with such a statement. In light of 
the fact that the contract was rescinded so far as the 
defendants and plaintiff, Kenneth Easmussen, are con-
cerned, the results would probably be the same, that is 
to say, a valid rescission could be had whether fraud or 
misrepresentation was or was not perpetrated. That 
was the reason that plaintiffs made no attempt to fully 
develop the elements that are necessary to constitute 
actionable fraud. If it is meant by such so-called finding 
that no fraud or misrepresentation was shown, then 
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we cannot agree with such finding. The evidence to 
which we have heretofore directed the attention of the 
court shows fraud and misrepresentation although no 
attempt was made to show the extent of the damage 
sustained by the plaintiffs because when a contract is 
rescinded the matter of damages is no longer a proper 
subject matter of inquiry as the rights of the parties 
are, when a rescission is had, to be placed in status quo. 
We shall defer our discussion of the legal effect of the 
contract until we take up the Fourth Point where the 
same question is raised. 
POINT THEEE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
ING NO. THREE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ONLY 
QUESTION INVOLVED IS WHETHER THE DOWN PAY-
MENT OF $8000.00 MAY PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED AS 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OR WHETHER THE SAME 
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE BY THIS COURT AND LEFT 
TO THE JURY TO DECIDE. (R. 73). 
We have not and do not now contend that the ques-
tion of the rescission of the contract should be left to 
the jury. As we understand the law the question of ^ 
whether a contract should or should not be rescinded is 
an equitable matter. If, as the pleadings and the evi-
dence which was received at the trial show, the contract 
was rescinded, then there is no occasion for either the 
court or the jury to pass upon the question of a rescis-
sion. However, in this case, the controversy, so far as 
we can ascertain from the pleadings, is not whether there 
was a rescission, but what were the terms thereof. When, 
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as here, the parties are agreed that a rescission was had, 
but they are apparently not agreed as to the terms of 
the oral agreement, it would seem clearly to be the 
province of the jury to determine what were the terms 
thereof the same as it is the province of the jury to find 
facts that are in dispute in other oral agreements. 
POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL GOURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FINDING 
NO. FOUR TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FORFEITURE 
CLAUSE INVOLVING THE $8000.00 DOWN PAYMENT IS 
FAIR AND JUST UNDER THE CONTRACT; THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS TERMINATED SAID CONTRACT OF THEIR OWN 
FREE WILL AND THAT THE $8000.00 DOWN PAYMENT 
PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONTRACT SHOULD BE AND 
HEREBY IS FORFEITED BY PLAINTIFFS TO DEFEND-
ANTS AS LIQUIDATED DAMAGES, WHICH, IN THE 
OPINION OF THE COURT, ELIMINATES ANY QUESTION 
OF DAMAGES TO BE DETERMINED BY THE JURY. (R. 
73). 
It will be seen that the so-called finding which is 
attacked by Point Four is in part a finding of facts, 
in part a conclusion of law, in part a judgment and in 
part a* mere expression of the opinion of the court. 
Both the plaintiffs and defendants by their pleadings 
allege that the contract was rescinded. They differ only 
as to the terms of the rescission. If the plaintiffs' alle-
gations about the terms of the rescission had been estab-
lished by the evidence, that is one thing, and if the alle-
gations of the defendants as to the terms of the rescis-
sion had been established by any evidence, which it was 
not, that is quite another. 
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Apparently the so-called finding numbered four 
above quoted was intended to put the stamp of approval 
on the contract here involved. Even if the provisions 
of that contract dealing with the matter of forfeiture 
were held to be valid contrary to our contention, that 
would not solve the controversy between the parties to 
this action. 
In this case the evidence shows that Mrs. Rasmussen 
was never informed of the claim made by the defendants 
that the down payment of $8000.00 was to be forfeited 
at or prior to the time the Rasmussens vacated the Davis 
property. If the purpose of finding No. 4 is intended 
to preclude her from recovering back a par t of the 
$8000.00 down payment because the defendants had a 
right to and did declare a forfeiture of the $8000.00, 
then we take issue with such a claim. I t will be noted that 
by the terms of the contract the defendants may declare 
a forfeiture not only of the $8000.00 down payment, but 
also of the $5000.00 note secured by a mortgage on cows 
belonging to the plaintiff if plaintiffs were guilty of any 
breach. The provisions of paragraph 6 of the contract 
is about as all embracing and harsh as can be drawn, 
except possibly under its provisions the plaintiff's could 
not be deprived of the custody of their children, if they 
breached the contract. 
I t will be seen that not only did the defendants 
receive the $8000.00 down payment, but they also received 
a $5000.00 note and mortgage. Thus they had a down 
payment equivalent to $13,000.00 which, under the terms 
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of the contract, they could retain if the plaintiffs breach-
ed their contract in any particular such as a failure 
to pay the premium on a fire insurance policy or the 
taxes. Even the defendants seem to have had the 
semblance of a conscience when they concluded that it 
would be asking for too much to not only retain the 
down payment of $8000.00, but also the $5000.00 note 
and mortgage. If as we contend the provision of the 
contract dealing with forfeiture was invalid when exe-
cuted, its invalidity could not be cured by the defendants 
foregoing an attempt to retain all that the contract pro-
vided might be retained. In light of the recent decision 
of this court in the case of Perkins et al. v. Spencer et al., 
243 Pac. 446 (not yet in Utah Eeports) and the other 
cases from this jurisdiction there cited, we shall not 
cite other cases or authorities. As we read that case the 
provisions therein contained dealing with a forfeiture 
are indeed mild as compared with the provisions touch-
ing a forfeiture in this case. 
POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS FAILED TO PAY THEIR PART OF THE TAXES 
ON THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE CONTRACT 
AND FAILED TO PAY THE FIRE INSURANCE PREMIUM 
UPON THE PROPERTY. 
All that need be said about this finding is that 
nowhere does it appear what part of the taxes the 
plaintiffs were to pay or the amount of taxes, or that 
plaintiffs refused to pay the same, and the record is 
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absolutely devoid of any evidence as to fire insurance 
premiums. 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS FIND-
ING NO. SIX WHEREIN IT FOUND THAT THE PARTIES 
HAVE DISCHARGED AND TERMINATED ALL THEIR 
RIGHTS INVOLVED IN THIS ACTION. 
Such finding No. 6 is not only without support in the 
evidence, but it is contrary to the uncontradicted testi-
mony of plaintiff, Kenneth Easmussen, to which we have 
heretofore referred in which he repeatedly testified that 
he did not agree that the defendants should retain the 
down payment of $8000.00. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ACTION 
SHOULD BE DISMISSED AND DEFENDANTS SHOULD 
BE AWARDED THEIR COSTS. 
The matters we have heretofore discussed apply to 
Point Seven, and we shall not enlarge upon what is 
there said. 
POINT EIGHT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
THAT THE ACTION BE DISMISSED AND THAT DEFEND-
ANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
If the court erred in the particulars heretofore dis-
cussed, it follows that the plaintiffs are entitled to pre-
vail on this assigned error. The trial court not only 
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invaded the province of the jury in taking this case 
from it, but likewise erred in the particulars heretofore 
discussed. 
It is submitted that the judgment should be reversed 
and the cause remanded to the court below for trial with 
a jury, and that appellants should be awarded their 
costs. 
Kespectfully submitted, 
DON MACK DALTON 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
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